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Abstract. Many artificial intelligence (AI) speakers have recently come to market. Beginning with Amazon
Echo, many companies producing their own speaker technologies. Due to the limitations of technology, most
speakers have similar functions, but the way of handling the data of each speaker is different. In the case of
Amazon echo, the API of the cloud is open for any developers to develop their API. The Amazon Echo has
been around for a while, and much research has been done on it. However, not much research has been done
on Google Home Mini analysis for digital investigations. In this paper, we will conduct some initial research
on the data storing and security methods of Google Home Mini.
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1   Introduction
Artificial  Intelligence (AI)  is  a critical  component of the Internet  of Things (IoT).  The cloud connects and
controls various electronic devices based on the Internet. AI can control objects according to the surrounding
environment. Also, self-learning is possible through natural language understanding and deep learning, and it is
tailored to the convenience of users. Meanwhile, AI is an unshaped interface, so companies combine AI with
device  for  commercializing.  That  is  AI speaker.  The AI speaker  is  a  speaker  with an AI secretary  on the
Bluetooth speaker. It can work with other AI devices and can be controlled by the voice. For international AI
speakers include Amazon Echo, Google’s Google Home and Google Home Mini and Apple HomePod. For
domestic AI speakers include SK Telecom NUGU, KT GiGA Genie, Naver Clover and Kakao Kakao Mini. The
AI speaker to be covered in this paper is the Google Home Mini made by Google. The Google Home Mini is a
small  version  of  Google  Home launched in October  2017 and launched in September  2018 in Korea.  OS
supports Android 5.0 or above, iOS 9.1 or above. To use the Google Home Mini, the user needs to sync it with
the Google Home app, and the Google assistant will work when user registers and Wi-Fi certified in user app
[8]. There has not been much research on the Google Home Mini compared to the Amazon Echo. In this paper,
try to analyze Google Home Mini, its data storing system and security system. Research subjects include Google
Home Mini, Google Home App, network, and local API. Then, with the data obtained, will be solved in terms
of digital forensic perspective.
2   Background Research
Chung [2] presented a cloud acquisition tool for IoT environments, which is called CIFT(Cloud-based IoT
Forensic). They tested it for about two months. For the quality of the test, they focused on certain products, web
browsers and used python. Through the test, they got unofficial Alexa APIs, native artefacts – user accounts,
Alexa-enabled devices and saved Wi-Fi settings, client-centric artefacts and web cache. Especially for the web
cache for Android and Chrome, it seems as though the data has the potential to be useful digital evidence as it
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helped to expect the user’s action. Though the paper, they focused on the findings and proof-of-concept tool to
be useful for researchers who work on Amazon Alexa in digital forensic investigation view. In the paper, it will
be useful to mention what kind of comments they gave, how much data left. 
Clinton [12] tested Amazon echo’s system on privacy and vulnerabilities for security. By tearing down the
speaker, we tried to exploit the echo hardware system. The paper found three primary methods to access to the
speaker, which are the SD card pinout, an eMMC style root, and JTAG. It means Amazon echo is vulnerable for
the physical attack, which means people can access to the speaker and get the data out from the speaker, and the
privacy of the user is also in danger. Thus, the paper suggests being aware of these kinds of matters to protect
the data.  Currently released  AI speakers  are hard to connect  physically.  Therefore,  it  would be unlikely to
happen. 
Wohlwend [10] discusses Amazon Alexa and echo system structure, security policy and security test for the
Echo. The paper focuses on three main goals for security, which are confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Then through the four-security  testing – sound, network,  direct  API,  and third-party skills  – they find that
Amazon echo stores data based on the Amazon cloud server and the device resist an attack of network and API.
Then imply the third-party skills can be a vulnerability. It would be good if the paper talks more detail about the
API based attack and give a try on third-party skills not only mentioning on the paper. 
A 2018 article [7] describes how Google voice technology works in digital forensics. ‘OK, Google’ can be
used to unlock mobile locks. If you have only the voice file of the suspect, you can unlock the phone and extract
the data. In other words, the suspect’s voice can be used to find the suspect’s mobile device. Also, it can be
applied to other smart devices using the Google assistant. The Google Home Mini can also wake up the device
with ‘OK Google’ or ‘Hey Google’, and some features require voice verification. This means that if the suspect
is a user of the Google Home Mini, the suspect’s voice can tell whether the device is being used or not, and if
the Google Home Mini is connected to another smart device, also can find some data of the suspect. 
Hyde [13] analyzed Amazon echo, and Amazon echo dot devices itself, Kasa and Alexa mobile app, network,
connected devices Amazon echo has SanDisk SDIN7DP2-4G, ISP pin is out. Amazon Echo Dot has different
eMMC  on  each  board.  ISP  pin  is  also  out.  Through  the  imaging,  they  found  Wi-Fi  connections,  device
information log, registration information from the device. In the app, they found, some databases and in the web
application, they got URL of calling and messaging. Also, for the APIs, the cards, device, Wi-Fi, Smart Home
devices, Activities were found. In the Kasa, which was the TP-Link smart devices mobile app, some critical data
were found such as account, password and location. They focused on what kind of data was stored and where
the data was stored. 
Dipert [3] explains the inside of Google Home Mini by tear down. Inside of the device, audio amplifier,
metal shield with a combination of Marvell’s 88DE3006-BTK2 system SoC, Toshiba NAND flash memory, two
embedded antennas, SK Hynix 4GB DDR3L SDRAM, microphones and manufacturing code sticker are found.
In the papers, expect the same result as this blog shows and will be a more detailed explanation.
Moore [14] investigated about Google speakers based on the several investigative questions. He analyzed
Google Home app with mobile phone, device itself using software tools and chip off and lastly, cloud service.
From the phone, google account information, device location, cloud device ID and wifi  password are been
found. By examining the internals of the speaker, open ports, GET/POST requests, and Bluetooth information
that is connected to the device such as MAC address, device name and date that has been connected. From the
chip off, Google Home Mini has Toshiba TC58NVG1S3HBA16 256 MB NAND flash and use BGA 67 Socket,
NAND Flash Chip Reader (Dataman) to read the data inside of the chip. From the dump, Bluetooth device
information  and  Google  account.  For  cloud  acquisition,  mainly  used  Google’s  ‘My Activity’  and  Google
Takeout. Through acquisition, not all but some given commands and answers were found. for the future work,
parse Google Home file system, decoding of the proto file, iOS app examination and calling feature.
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3   Research Problem and Methodology
To date, very few works have looked at the Google Home Mini (GHM) from a digital investigation perspective.
This work is an initial analysis of the locations and types of data related to the Google Home Mini, and is meant
to be a starting point for future data acquisition studies. In this work, we separate the study into three main
sections: the device, the mobile app and the network. Based on our past experiences, each of these locations
provide different – but related – data that may be of evidential value.
We  used  Google  Home  Mini's  built-in  functions  and  direct  interaction  to  generate  user-related  data.
Commands were given directly to the Google Home Mini (serial number: 7B28L5NRWF) as well as via the
mobile phone application (Galaxy note 4, SM-N910S, Android version 6.0.1). For this research, Korean and
English were used to give commands. After the function test, chip-off was used to acquire additional embedded
device data. After the chip off, the chip was imaged using Hancom GMD MD-series acquisition software.
Google has a mobile app called ‘Google home’. The app version we used was 2.9.40.16. A user can give a
command from the phone by speaking or typing. Also, the user can control the device in the app. To extract the
data that is stored in the app, the ES File Explorer has been used. ES File Explorer is a free and featured file
(application, document and multimedia) manager for local and network use. The version is 4.1.9.9.21. For the
analysis,  the phone (Galaxy Note4,  SM-N910S) and laptop (Samsung, NT905S3G-KSQB) have been used.
First, it generates data using the app. Then in the ES File Explorer, check whether the phone is rooted. Second,
follow the  path:  device/data/data/Chromecast.  Third,  copy the  Chromecast  folder  and  paste  in  the  internal
storage. Then connect the phone to the laptop using a USB cable to extract the Chromcast folder. After all these
steps, in this research, use Autopsy (version 4.10) to analyze the data. Add folder as Logical file. 
In the network analysis, use Wireshark (version 3.0.0) and Zenmap (version7.7.0) to acquire the data. Figure
1. shows how the network has connected for the test. Google Home Mini and the mobile phone are connected to
the laptop - the laptop works as an access point using its hotspot - and the laptop is connected to the internet and
internet connects to the Google cloud.
We use the GUI version of Nmap, Zenmap, to look for open ports in the speaker’s IP address. Use Telnet to
see if the ports are listening. The test the vulnerability according to the usage of each port. Vulnerability testing
uses Metasploit, Heartbleed and Openssl with Kali Linux. After that, uses Burp suite (v1.7.36) and Postman to
acquire the data. In the Burp Suite, under proxy, add the laptop IP address and port 8080 and in the mobile
phone Wi-Fi advanced setting, set proxy manual and port 8080. Then it intercepts the network of the speaker
that talks to the phone through the laptop.
Fig. 1. Google Home Mini network setup for device, mobile app and network data collection.
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4   Data Collection and Analysis
This section covers different types of analysis we conducted on the Google Home Mini hardware and software
with a focus on the mobile app analysis.
4.1   Google Home Mini Hardware
The Google Home Mini measures 98mm in diameter, 42mm in height and weight 173g. The colours are chalk,
charcoal,  coral-google store exclusive,  and durable fabric  material  on the top. The Wi-Fi network supports
802.11b/g/n/ac (2.4 GHz/5 GHz) and features 4.1 Bluetooth. There is a microphone on/off switch and a micro-
USB power connector on the back and a reset button right below the power connector.
4.2   Google Home Mini Functions
To use  the  functions,  the  user  should  say  wake-up  words  are  ‘Hey,  google’  and  ‘Ok,  google’.  About  20
languages are available. If the user talks in English, the speaker responses in English. If the user talks in Korean,
the  speaker  responses  in  Korean.  Also,  it  provides  information  related  to  the  language.  There  are  many
functions. It is similar to other speakers — for example, weather, alarm, news, traffic, and more. Among the
functions, there are two functions which are ‘Routine’ and ‘Remembering Things’. User can make a routine
command to suit their lifestyle. For example, if the user says ‘Bedtime, the speaker tells tomorrow’s weather,
tomorrow’s first calendar event and ask what time the alarm should be set for then play sleep sounds. It will be a
good way to know user behaviour. For ‘Remembering Things’, once the user gives the command ‘remember
that my key is on the desk next to the door’, Google Home Mini accept the command, and when a user asks for
the key, it tells where the key is. It will be useful to find something about the user.
4.3   App Analysis
Table 1 shows data and locations from the Google Home app on the mobile phone. Some tokens, account ID,
the nickname of the device, address of the speaker, app version, port, phone IP address and Wi-Fi name and
password  list.  For the Wi-Fi  and password list,  the phone has  been connected  to three  different  networks.
Neo_house6 is the actual network router, and DESKTOP-ENIL7DS is a hotspot from the laptop. Both laptops
were connected to the router and hotspot.
With the information from the app, it can be used when the users deny that they have never use the speaker or
they do not have one. The user ID and location will verify and identify where the user is and was. Also, with the
tokens, extract the data from the cloud is available. Also, Wi-Fi tells the connection between the user and the
speaker.
Table 1.  Potential evidential data found from the Google Home Mini Mobile App Analysis
Location Data
/LogicalFileSet1/com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/
shared_prefs/com.google.android.gms.appid.xml
 LastToken
 appVersion
/LogicalFileSet1/com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/
shared_prefs/
com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app_preferences_no_b
ackup.xml
 lastRefreshTime
 selected_routine_device_id
 ph_server_token
 gcmIdToken
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 61 Sakju-ro, Gyo-dong, Chuncheon, Gangwon-
do, South Korea
 Longitude/ latitude
 home_graph_last_refreshed_simonhallym@gmai
l.com
 addressLine2 Chuncheon, Gangwon-do 200-060
 current_account_name simonhallym@gmail.com
 Wi-Fi name and password list 
[{&quot;n&quot;:&quot;neo_house6&quot;,&qu
ot;p&quot;:&quot;********&quot;,&quot;s&qu
ot;:2},{&quot;n&quot;:&quot;DESKTOP-
ENIL7DS 
3926&quot;,&quot;p&quot;:&quot;dkssudgktpd
y!!&quot;,&quot;s&quot;:1},
{&quot;n&quot;:&quot;me&quot;,&quot;p&quo
t;:&quot;********&quot;,&quot;s&quot;:2}]
 current_home_id_simonhallym@gmail.com
 addressLine 61 Gyo-dong
/LogicalFileSet1/com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/
shared_prefs/
com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app_preferences.xml
 live_card_consistency_token com.google.h.b.d.a.
w@7bc6f 
 dismissedActionChipSetupDevicesFA:8F:CA:98
:A5:5 
 setup-salt e3452b4b-9fd6-42b6-8e47-
e71bc8dd0741
/LogicalFileSet1/com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/
cache/cronet_http_cache/prefs/local_prefs.json
 servers:https://googlehomefoyer-
pa.googleapis.com
 expiration:13200914931582426 
 port:443 
 address:192.168.166.11
/LogicalFileSet1/
com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/files/
home_graph_c2ltb25oYWxseW1AZ21haWwuY29t.p
roto
 OfficeZeLIFS
simonhallym@gmail.com 
216-33 Gyo-dong, Chuncheon,
Gangwon-do, South Korea  
 bettyhallym@gmail.com2 
 google.com:api-project-498579633514
5759C8B0CEAFB4B8D438569D3288716F: 41d
28897-d2b4-4d80-bc26-de7057ec36b6 
 google.com:api-project-498579633514  5759C8
B0CEAFB4B8D438569D3288716F 
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4.4   Network Analysis
We used Wireshark to capture the network traffic between the access point, the Google Home Mini and the
mobile device running the GHM app.
Fig. 2. Network traffic collection between the mobile device (app) and the Google Home Mini cloud service. 
Figure 2 shows the network packet between the mobile and the cloud. During this time, the commands have
been given to the Google Home mobile application. As Figure 3 shows, Google APIs and mobile share the
application data with TLSv1.2, which is encrypted. Also, sometimes use the latest encryption protocol TLSv1.3
encryption as well [1]. 
Fig. 3. Network traffic collection between the mobile device (app) and the Google Home Mini cloud service using TLSv1.3
Fig. 4. Network traffic collection between the Google Home Mini speaker (device) and the Google cloud service.
Figure 4 is the network packet between the Google Home Mini and google browser. It is captured when the
command  has  given  to  the  device.  As  Figure  4  shows,  it  also  uses  the  TLSv1.2  encryption  to  share  the
application data. 
After finding encrypted network traffic using Wireshark, we used Zenmap to discover the open ports as a first
step to detect any vulnerabilities. The test takes the same setup condition as Wireshark. There were five open
ports for the Google Home Mini in TCP protocol, and it is also the same for UDP protocol. In the previous
research [14] also showed same number of the ports so it seemed to be fixed open ports. Among these ports, the
test focuses on two ports, which are 8009 and 8443. We used Telnet to test open ports for listening status and
service detection. Through Telnet testing, all five ports were found to be listening. Then, we investigated those
ports with Kali Linux. For the test, without using hotspot of the laptop, put speaker, mobile phone and laptop in
the same network, which is neo_house6.
Basic  known attacks  were  conducted  against  the  open  ports  using  Metasploit.  No ports  were  immediately
vulnerable to known attacks. Next, we moved to a local API test. 
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Fig. 5. Some of APIs are found by using Burp Suite.
By using Burp Suite, some APIs are found which are the app_device_id and parameters for version, name,
build_info, device_info, net, wifi, setup, settings, opt_in, opencast, multizone, sign, proxy, night_mode_params,
user_eq, room_equalizer, aogh&options in figure 5. Also, aglio [5] has created an unofficial APIs that is used
between the Google Home app and Google Home so apply some APIs to the Google Home Mini to find the
APIs. Findings are in Table 2.
Table 2.  API calls and information returned from a Google Home Mini on the local network.
Type Info API Returned
GET Parameters 
http://192.168.166.40:8008/
setup/eureka_info?
params=version,name,build_info,
device_info,net,wifi,setup,setting
s,opt_in,opencast,multizone,sign,
proxy,night_mode_params,user_
eq,room_equalizer,aogh&options
=detail,sign 
device_info: 
cloud_device_id: "D2C293358C936F117
57914443A7C3F57", 
factory_country_code: "US", 
hotspot_bssid: "FA:8F:CA:98:A5:5B", 
mac_address: "20:DF:B9:4E:87:FE", 
manufacturer: "Google Inc.", 
model_name: "Google Home Mini", 
product_name: "mushroom", 
name: "Office speaker", 
net: ip_address: "192.168.166.40", 
settings: 
country_code: "KR", 
locale: "en-US", 
timezone: "Asia/Seoul", 
wifi: 
bssid: "90:9f:33:db:10:de", 
ssid: "neo_house6" 
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GET Eureka Info http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/eureka_info 
bssid: "90:9f:33:db:10:de", 
hotspot_bssid: "FA:8F:CA:98:A5:5B", 
ip_address: "192.168.166.40", 
locale: "en-US", 
location: 
country_code: "KR", 
latitude: 255, 
longitude: 255 
mac_address: "20:DF:B9:4E:87:FE", 
name: "Living Room", 
ssid: "neo_house6", 
timezone: "Asia/Seoul", 
uma_client_id: "cc918aa3-2bba-46d2-aa3c-
bfe1fa3c275b" 
GET offer http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/offer 
token: "ADtqmfTJx82eFvi_wg3BOUfBcUmZgF_ik
7veTnYR0hc9MTyJxXQZIJb_OY4B2CEvZizrabJq
cZp4DyjvCPBV53Ya1qJ05SdNiY5zxADnaIB04sS
iflT-IjZUj2yaowZFQxlQUFHLiKDm" 
GET Time zone http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/supported_timezones 
display_string: "Hawaii-Aleutian  Standard  Time
(Honolulu)", 
timezone: "Pacific/Honolulu" 
display_string: "Hawaii-Aleutian Daylight 
*support many different time zone 
GET Supportedlocales 
http://192.168.166.40:8008/
setup/supported_locales 
display_string: "Amharic - አማርኛ", 
locale: "am" 
display_string: "Arabic - ةيبرعلا", 
locale: "ar" 
*support many different locales 
GET Alarm http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/assistant/alarms 
day: 1, 
month: 4, 
year: 2019 
fire_time: 1554108270000, 
id: "alarm/5d762a93-0000-20b9-9fa8-
f4f5e80b89c8", 
status: 1, 
time_pattern: 
hour: 17, 
minute: 44, 
second: 30 
GET Bluetooth http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/bluetooth/status 
connected_devices: 
device_class: 5898764, 
mac_address: "10:92:66:13:c0:4a", 
name: "Hallym Simon (Galaxy Note4)" 
GET Configured network 
http://192.168.166.40:8008/
setup/configured_networks 
ssid: "me", 
ssid: "DESKTOP-ENIL7DS 3926", 
ssid: "neo_house6" 
POST App  deviceID 
http://192.168.166.40:8008/
setup/get_app_device_id 
"app_device_id":
"D2C293358C936F11757914443A7C3F57" 
POST 
Internet
download
speed 
http://192.168.166.40:8008/
setup/
test_internet_download_speed 
"bytes_received": 31457280, 
"response_code": 200, 
"time_for_data_fetch": 21807, 
"time_for_http_response": 819 
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POST Scan Wi-Fi http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/scan_wifi Response 200 
GET Scan results http://192.168.166.40:8008/setup/scan_results 
bssid: "90:9f:33:db:10:de", 
bssid: "90:9f:33:db:10:de", 
ssid: "neo_house6" 
The data can be used for investigation. For example, tokens can be a key to extract the data from the cloud. In
parameters and some APIs have the network information of the speaker,  which can tell which network the
speaker is using. Other AI products connected through this network can also be identified. If the Bluetooth
function is on, the investigator can check the information of the device connected to the speaker. If the speaker
is connected to the mobile, it can discover the user’s mobile model and MAC address.
4.5   Chip-off Analysis
After imaging the chip off data, a small file of 90,213KB was created and it was all in carved files. The carved
files are analyzed with Autopsy 4.10.0.
Fig. 6. .dd file opened with Autopsy to analyze
Bunch of log text files are stored but it does not contain much information. Table 3 shows some findings.
Table 3.  Acquired log text data from chip-off
File name Data
F0161412  RAM:  476992K total,  271004K free,  42636K
buffers, 83604K cached, 108K shmem, 9252K
slab
 Kernel log
F0166284  NAND device: Manufacturer ID: 0x98, Chip ID: 
0xda (Toshiba 256MiB 8-bit)
F0168388  Product name: mushroom
Product model: Google Home Mini
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 Wifi.interface: mlan0
Wifi.ap.dev_name: ipTIMEAP
Wifi.ap.manufacturer: ipTIME
Wifi.ap.model.name: ipTIMEAP
Wifi.ap.modle_number: 1234567890
Wifi.ap.vendor_prefix: [90:9f:33]
F0167416  OS platform: Linux
F160746  User name: Hallym simon
Phone model: Galaxy Note 4
MAC address: [10:92:66:13:c0:4a]
The .ogg files were open with Groove 2018 from Microsoft and VLC media player (version 3.0.7.1) but all
failed. Even converted ogg to mp3 file, did not work. In addition, the sqlite file was also not able to open. It is
expected that corruption would have occurred during the imaging process. 
5   Conclusion
Through the test, several facts are confirmed. First, Google Home Mini does not store much data in the app.
Second, by using Wireshark, it has found that how Google Home Mini, Google Home app and the Google cloud
exchange data. They exchange the data using TLSv1.2 encryption and occasionally using the latest version of
encryption TLSv1.3. Third, Google Home Mini has five open ports, which are HTTP, ajp13, https-alt, cslistener
and scp-config. The vulnerability tests on the ajp13 and https-alt ports are done, and they are not exploitable.
Then use the Burp suite and Postman to find the local APIs. In the API, some essential data exists, like tokens
that can be used for cloud data, configured network information of speakers, Wi-Fi information, setting country
for speaker,  time zone, and Bluetooth information. For chip off, not much data is stored These data can be
applied if  the suspect  has a Google Home Mini in his house, and the suspect  is  denied telling its  use and
connection between them. Additional work still needs to be done on the device, application and network levels
of the Google home mini to find additional, potentially hidden, data. Further, software updates for the GHM are
frequent, and new artefacts may be introduced with each new update. Also, this test has don only for Android.
Thus, the test for iOS will be needed to get more date about Google Home devices.
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